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Why does the cost of living crisis feel permanent?

Nearly three in five Britons think the cost of living crisis will never end, and the data gives them reason to worry: the average UK wage buys no more than it did in 2005. All nine Prime Ministers in office since then have tried to break the cycle but with limited success - partly due to factors outside their control but also because most of the levers they could pull to improve things for some people have drawbacks. This is why, for a significant chunk of the country, the squeeze feels permanent.

We mostly think of the cost of living as a rocketing of prices, particularly everyday necessities

Ask your friends, family, colleagues what they think of as the ‘cost of living’ and you will likely hear the same thing: the increasing price of basic necessities such as food, energy, housing and transport. Ask the economic organisations - primarily central banks such as the Bank of England or the European Central Bank - tasked with managing inflation, and they have a slightly different definition. They still track prices, but of a broad ‘basket’ of goods and services including everything from toothpaste to pet grooming, weighted to account for their importance to households. This is the Consumer Price Index (CPI). The Office for National Statistics (ONS) computes how much this basket has risen every month, and the Bank of England then decides whether to increase or decrease interest rates to try and keep prices in line with a ‘target’, manageable, rate of inflation, typically 2%.

By either measure the squeeze is real. Of the 20 items that have increased in price most between 2020 and 2025, 11 were food items, many of which are inputs into other foods we buy, such as vegetable oil and sugar (Figure 1). And between 2020 and 2025, the typical item in the CPI rose by about 30%, against 7% in the previous five years. This is roughly three times what inflation at the 2% target would have led to.

Figure 1

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This graph presents the 20 goods that have become the most expensive over the period 2020–2025. Olive oil experienced the highest inflation at around 100%, followed by gas and specialised meat products. Most listed goods saw over 30% price increases during this period, a sharp contrast to more modest changes between 2015 and 2020, with the majority of items falling into the food category.

The weighting of each price by its share of actual household spend shows what hits budgets most: rents, gas, electricity, restaurants and holidays (Figure 2). Some of these are costs we cannot escape even when there is a crisis - demand is ‘inelastic’ as it is difficult to move for lower rent, and hard to reduce energy consumption below a minimum floor. While we can cut down on eating out and holidays, doing so contributes to the sense that a decent quality of life is increasingly unaffordable.

Figure 2

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This graph presents the inflation contribution (the product of inflation and weight) between 2020 and 2025, comparing the 20 most expensive goods with the 2015–2020 period. While food items dominated raw price increases, restaurants and cafés, housing rents, package holidays and gas contributed the most to overall inflation because of their higher weight in household spending baskets.

Price rises are not just a result of supply shocks from wars in Ukraine and the Middle East

The cost of living crisis is not unique to the UK. The wars in Ukraine and Iran have constrained the supply of fuel, gas and fertiliser, pushing up prices of energy and food production globally. These are global issues that can’t be solved by the UK government - the UK can’t make foreign gas imported from the Middle East cheaper, and it can’t reduce prices of olive oil produced in southern Europe.

But if you look at how the UK compares to our European neighbours, you can get a sense of where there are uniquely British drivers of the problem (Figure 3). In some areas, our prices have risen much faster than our peers - like rents, out of home food consumption, clothing and holidays. That suggests there is scope for domestic policy decisions to make a difference, and it is not just a case of equally inherited woes. Likewise there are some areas where the UK’s prices are doing comparatively better - food or cars - which suggest UK policy choices might be doing something right.

It is worth noting that inflation data is noisy so it is difficult to isolate precise drivers of price increases - and some categories may be more expensive because we have made proactive policy choices to make them so as with tobacco - but the trend of disproportionately high UK prices is notable.

Figure 3

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This graph presents the inflation gap between the UK and five EU countries (France, Germany, Spain, Italy, and Portugal), where positive values indicate the UK is more expensive. The UK has become significantly more expensive than these peers for rents, catering services, alcohol, clothing, education, and tobacco—many of which are non-tradable commodities.

But prices would not matter (as much) if wages had kept up

Prices are only half the picture. Would we care about prices doubling if our income doubled as well? The answer is probably yes because we tend to attribute price increases to factors outside our control and wage increases to our own ability, but regardless, a more meaningful measure of cost of living is one that accounts for our income as well as the price of the goods we buy. In other words, our ‘real wage’.

By this measure the UK also has a problem. The average UK wage buys no more today than it did in 2005 (Figure 4). Only Italy is worse off, but the Netherlands, France, Denmark, Germany, Spain and the US all did better.

Figure 4

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This graph presents the real wage index across OECD countries, indexed at 1 in 2005. The United Kingdom has experienced notable real wage stagnation compared to other OECD nations that saw overall growth (with the exception of Italy), highlighting the UK's particularly weak economic position.

The UK’s wage stagnation hides disparities that matter for why almost everyone is feeling the pinch. The lowest paid workers have actually experienced modest wage growth given policy choices to increase minimum wage etc, but these will feel limited given the larger share of their income spent on necessities. And earners above minimum wage are feeling squeezed because the average wage hasn’t risen in real terms in decades. Wage growth - where it exists - is actually a product of protective policy choices for the most vulnerable, rather than a product of economic growth driving up incomes for everyone.

Figure 5

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This graph presents the average wage compared with wages for the top 10% and bottom 10%, indexed at 1 in 2005. The bottom 10% have witnessed a real wage increase, when the top 10% has witnessed a real wage decline.

For the issues which are fairly uniquely ours - housing, energy, food and services or holidays - there are few short-term measures which do not prolong the crisis by driving inflation, and few long-term measures which will yield short-term relief. We will be digging into the options and trade-offs in our next blog.

Author

Juliette Caucheteux

Juliette Caucheteux

Senior economic adviser, policy team

Juliette is the senior economic adviser for Nesta’s central policy team and sustainable future mission.

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Isobel Scott-Barrett

Isobel Scott-Barrett

Head of policy

Isobel leads the policy team focused on UK government with a particular focus on issues that could enable or unblock progress on our mission goals.

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