Embracing the "threat" of India and China

Stop bleating about the "threat" from India and China, begs James Wilsdon.

In the 1970s, western politicians and pundits were sent into near-hysterics by the rapid rise of a new Asian technological superpower that threatened European and American economies and jobs. These days, you don't hear many people lamenting Japan's contributions to global innovation. They're more likely to be using their Japanese computers to write essays about the rise of two Asian technological superpowers that threaten European and American economies and jobs-China and India.

These two vast, hetereogenous nations-home to a third of the world's population-find themselves perpetually yoked in a form of political shorthand designed to signify the onward march of globalisation. In many different policy areas, but particularly science, China and India have got policymakers running scared. America, for instance, has long been the world's leading scientific nation on whatever indicator you like-publications, patents, Nobel prizes. But despite this success, American scientists and policymakers are watching the rapid ascent of China and India with some alarm.

A recent report from the US National Academies of Sciences, apocalyptically titled Rising Above the Gathering Storm, warned that for the cost of one chemist or engineer in the US, a company could hire about five chemists in China or five engineers in India. As a result, the US "could lose [its] privileged position" in science.

The message appears to have got through to President Bush. In his January state of the union address, Bush cautioned against complacency in the face of "new competitors like China and India," and unveiled a $136bn American Competitiveness Initiative, which included $50bn for scientific research and a recruitment drive for science teachers.

Such concerns are by no means unique to America. Here in Britain the language may be more measured, but there's no disguising the concern being generated by the growing scientific strengths of Asia. Tony Blair and Gordon Brown rarely make a speech on globalisation or skills without a nod to the "125,000 computer science graduates" that China and India produced last year.

But no sooner have we got used to the idea of China as the world's manufacturing hub and India as a centre for back office services than globalisation moves up a gear. In the new geography of science, ideas emerge in unexpected places and flow around the world as easily as money and commodities, carried by a mobile diaspora of knowledge workers.

China and India are investing heavily in their research base. China's science spending has trebled since 1998 and is set to increase to 2.5 per cent of GDP by 2020, according to its latest 15-year plan. This cash is starting to yield results, particularly in fields such as nanotechnology and stem cell biology. One recent study placed China second only to the US in the number of papers published in top nanotechnology journals.

It is depressing, but perhaps predictable, that politicians and scientists on both sides of the Atlantic portray these developments as a threat-the latest manifestation of what some have dubbed "the challenge of Chindia." Such responses ignore the opportunities created by the emergence of new centres of innovation.

The US National Academies say: "We fear the abruptness with which a lead in science and technology can be lost." But retreating into scientific protectionism is no solution. Science is not a zero-sum game: more in Asia doesn't mean less in the west. To pretend otherwise is to misunderstand the nature of innovation; the way in which the work of one team builds on the successes and failures of others.

In the 21st century, it is those who are good at sharing, rather than protecting, knowledge who will flourish. Alongside new sources of competition, the rise of China and India creates new opportunities for collaboration. So rather than shoring up our scientific defences, our priority should be developing better mechanisms for orchestrating research across international networks, and supporting scientists in Europe to undertake joint research with their Asian counterparts.

Just as we have all benefited from Japan's rise, so we can all benefit from scientific advances in China and India. And more importantly, in two countries where the greatest problems are still poverty and underdevelopment, the people of China and India will benefit too.

First printed in The Quarter, Spring 2006